

Risk Management and Insurance

Tutorial 8. Risk Aversion and Insurance Demand

Question 1

Consider the CRRA utility function.

$$v(W) = \frac{W^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma}$$

- a) Compute the elasticity of marginal utility with regard to a change in wealth.

$$\varepsilon_{MU,W} = \frac{dv'}{dW} \frac{W}{v'} = \frac{v''W}{v'}$$

- b) What is the coefficient of relative risk aversion?
c) Is constant relative risk aversion a desirable property of a utility function?

Question 2

Show that the CRRA utility function simplifies to $\ln W$, if γ approaches 1.

Hint: Use L'Hôpital's rule.

Question 3

Does constant relative risk aversion imply decreasing absolute risk aversion? Does decreasing absolute risk aversion imply constant relative risk aversion?

Question 4

Consider an individual who faces a risky prospect:

Utility function: $u(W) = W^{0.5}$

Initial wealth: 10

Risky prospect: (-6, 0.5; +6, 0.5)

- a) Determine the individual's exact certainty equivalent and risk premium.
b) Use the Arrow-Pratt formula to obtain an approximation of the risk premium.
c) What is the individual's maximum willingness to pay for insurance?

Tutorial 8Question 1

a) With CRRA utility:

$$U' = w^{-\rho}$$

$$U'' = -\rho w^{-(1+\rho)}$$

Elasticity of marginal utility with respect to a change in wealth


$$\varepsilon_{MU, w} = \frac{dU'}{dw} \frac{w}{U'} = \frac{U'' w}{U'}$$

$$= \frac{-\rho w^{-(1+\rho)} w}{w^{-\rho}} = -\rho < 0$$

The wealth elasticity of MU ($\varepsilon_{MU, w}$) measures the sensitivity of MU with respect to a change in wealth.

An increase in wealth reduces MU.

With CRRA utility, $\varepsilon_{MU, w}$ is independent of wealth.



- b) The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion is the negative of $\Sigma_{u(w), w}$.

$$R_R = -\frac{u''(w) w}{u'(w)} = \beta$$

- c) It is an empirical question whether relative risk aversion is independent of wealth.

CRRAs (and CARAs) are convenient for analytical work.

Question 2

Limits of ratios of functions sometimes misbehave.

$$\lim_{x \rightarrow a} \frac{m(x)}{n(x)} \longrightarrow \frac{0}{0}, \frac{\infty}{\infty}$$

L'Hopital's rule says:

$$\lim_{x \rightarrow a} \frac{m(x)}{n(x)} = \lim_{x \rightarrow a} \frac{m'(x)}{n'(x)}$$

If this does not work, use 2nd, 3rd, ... order derivatives.

CRRRA utility function:

$$\lim_{\mu \rightarrow 1} \frac{w^{1-\mu} - 1}{1-\mu} \longrightarrow \frac{0}{0}$$

Base conversion:

$$w^{1-\mu} = (e^{\ln w})^{1-\mu} = e^{(1-\mu) \ln w}$$

Therefore:

$$V(w) = \frac{w^{1-\mu} - 1}{1-\mu} = \frac{e^{(1-\mu) \ln w} - 1}{1-\mu}$$

8-4

Apply L'Hôpital's rule (use 1st order derivatives of numerator and denominator):

$$\lim_{k \rightarrow 1} v(w) = \lim_{k \rightarrow 1} \frac{(1-k)\ln w}{e^{-\ln w} - 1}$$

$$= \ln w$$



Question 3

* CRRA \longrightarrow DARA

From the class notes:

$$R_A \frac{1}{f} = \frac{R_R}{w} = \frac{f}{w^{\frac{1}{p}}}$$

* CRRA ~~\Rightarrow~~ DARA

There are many utility functions that exhibit DARA but not CRRA.

For example, the quadratic utility function

$$U = aw - bw^2 \quad a, b > 0$$


exhibits DARA (when wealth is not too large) but not CRRA.

$$R_A \frac{1}{f} = -\frac{U''(w)}{U'(w)} = -\frac{-2b}{a-2bw^{\frac{1}{p}}} \quad (a > 2bw)$$

$$R_R = -\frac{U''(w)w}{U'(w)} = \frac{2b}{a-2bw} w$$

8-6

Question 4



a) $\omega_s^{0.5} = 3$

$$\omega_s = 3^2 = 9.$$

$$P = \omega_0 - \omega_s = 10 - 9 = 1$$

$$b) u' = 0.5 w^{-0.5}$$

$$u'' = -0.25 w^{-1.5}$$

$$R_A = -\frac{u''}{u'} = -\frac{(-0.25 w^{-1.5})}{0.5 w^{-0.5}}$$

$$= \frac{\frac{1}{4} w^{-1}}{\frac{1}{2}} = \frac{1}{2w} = \frac{1}{20}$$

$$\mathbb{E}(x) = -6 \times 0.5 + 6 \times 0.5 = 0$$

$$\sigma_x^2 = [(-6-0)]^{0.5} + [6-0]^{0.5} \\ = 18 + 18 = 36$$

$$P \approx \frac{1}{2} \sigma_x^2 R_A = \frac{1}{2} \cdot 36 \cdot \frac{1}{20}$$

$$= \frac{36}{40} = 0.9$$

$$c) MWP = |\mathbb{E}(x)| + P = 0 + 1 = 1$$

fair premium

Question 5

The consumer's utility function is:

$$v(w) = \ln w$$

$$v'(w) = \frac{1}{w} [= w^{-1}]$$

$$v''(w) = -w^{-2} = -\frac{1}{w^2}$$

The consumer's risk premium is:

$$\begin{aligned} R_A & \sim \\ P & \approx -\frac{1}{2} C_x^2 \frac{v''(w_0)}{v'(w_0)} = -\frac{1}{2} C_x^2 \frac{-\frac{1}{w_0^2}}{\frac{1}{w_0}} \\ & = -\frac{1}{2} C_x^2 \left(-\frac{1}{w_0}\right) = \frac{1}{2} \frac{50,000^2}{500,000} \frac{1}{w_0} \\ & = \$2500 \end{aligned}$$

As the expected change in wealth is zero, ($Ew = 0$), the consumer would be willing to pay $P = \$2500$ to avoid the risk.

Question 6

The farm's wheat production X is a random variable with:

$$\begin{aligned} E(X) &= 400 \times 1.8 = 720 \text{ t} \\ G_x^2 &= 400^2 \times 0.7^2 = 78,400 \text{ t}^2 \\ G_X &= \sqrt{78,400} = 280 \text{ t} \end{aligned}$$

The coefficient of variation is dimensionless:

$$\tilde{G}_X = \frac{G_X}{E(X)} = \frac{280}{720} \frac{\text{t}}{\text{t}} = 0.388889$$

The farmer's relative risk premium is

$$\begin{aligned} P^* &\approx \frac{1}{2} \tilde{G}_X^2 R_R \\ &\approx \frac{1}{2} \times 0.388889^2 \times 1.5 = 0.1134 \end{aligned}$$

The farmer would be willing to give away 11.3% of income for multi-peril crop insurance.

- (Although hail insurance emerged in Europe in the 19th century, there still exists no private multi-peril crop insurance that covers hail, drought and other perils. In several countries governments provide multi-peril crop insurance that includes drought. The subsidy is substantial if public insurance is available at – say – 3 % and farmers would be willing to pay ~~7.7%~~ 11.3%.)

Question 7

- initial wealth (w_0)
- ~~possible monetary loss (x)~~
- probability of loss event.

See next question.



Question 8

a) Without insurance, expected utility is:

$$\begin{aligned} EU &= 0.998 \ln(100,000) + 0.002 \ln(100,000 - 20,000) \\ &= 11.51248 \end{aligned}$$

The certainty equivalent is:

$$w_s = 11.51248$$

$$w_s = e^{11.51248} = \underline{\$ 99,955.38}$$

b) The expected loss is:


$$EX = x\pi = 20,000 \times 0.002 = \$ 40$$

Then, the consumer's risk premium is:

$$\begin{aligned} P &= \underbrace{EW}_{w_0} - \underbrace{U'(EU)}_{w_s} \\ &= w_0 - EX - w_s \\ &= 100'000 - 40 - 99,955.38 = \underline{\$ 4.62} \end{aligned}$$

The maximum willingness to pay for insurance is:

$$WTP^{\max} = 40 + 4.62 = \underline{\$ 44.62}$$



Summary

Definition of risk premium ρ :

$$EU = v(EW - \rho)$$

$$0.998 \ln 100,000 + 0.002 \ln (100,000 - 20,000) = \ln (100,000 - 40 - \rho)$$

$$11.51248 = \ln (99960 - \rho)$$

$$e^{11.51248} = 99960 - \rho$$

$$\rho = \underline{\$ 4.62}$$

c) The curvature of the logarithmic utility function is a bit low. The coefficient of relative risk aversion equals only 1.

An only moderately risk-averse person does not pay much for insurance.